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RECENT CASES.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTIoN-LIQUIDATED DEMAND-PAYMENT OF LESS
AMOUNT BY THIRD PARTY-After suit brought upon five promissory notes
the debtor's father, who was a stranger to the debt, paid to the creditor one-
half of the face value of twe notes in full settlement of the debt. Held: The
payment by the debtor's father was a valid accord and satisfaction for the
whole debt. Cunningham v. Irwin, T48 N. W. Rep. 786 (Mich. 1914).
Although it is how well settled that an accord and satisfaction entered
into by the creditor with a person other than the debtor, who is a stranger
to the consideration, discharges the debt, the English courts have had some
difficulty in establishing the doctrine. In Grymes v. Blofield, Cro. Eliz. 542
(1597), a plea by the defendant that an accord and satisfaction had been
given by a third party, was bad. Later cases laid down the rule that such
satisfaction was only good when it was made by the third person as agent
for and on account of the debtor, and with his prio'r authority or subsequent
ratification. Jones v..Broadhurst, 9 C. B. 173 (x8So); Belshaw v. Bushk 1
C. B. 191 (1851). The courts are inclined to find ratification upon very slight
evidence." Ratification may be made by pleading the satisfaction by the third
party at the time of the trial or by adopting it in any way whatever. Simpsoa
v. Eggington, xo Ex. 844 (x855). New York, Kentucky and Missouri have
adopted the English rule in all its essentials. Danziger v. Hoyt, i2o N. Y.
xgo (i8go). The general rule in America is that such satisfaction is a bar
to an action by the creditor against the debtor in all cases. Thompson v.
Conn. Mut. L. I. Co., 139 Ind. 325 (1894); Marshall v. Bullard, 114 Ia. 462
(xgoz). It seems, however, that wherever ratification appears, that fact is
relied upon. Snyder v. Pharo, 25 Fed. Rep. 398 (i885).
It is equally well settled that the acceptance of part in satisfaction of the
whole of a liquidated demand from the debtor himself is invalid because
without consideration. Fuller v. Kemp. 138 N. Y. 23! (1893). But see
contra, Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499 (1897). But if there is any departure,
however slight, in the manner or mode of paying the debt, from that which
is required, this is a sufficient consideration. Payment by a third party is,
therefore, the consideration for the acceptance of a less amount, since pay-
ment by the debtor is what is required. Fowler v. Smith, x53 Pa. 639 (18 3);
Marshall v. Bullard, supra. An unliquidated or disputed claim is not within
the scope of the above riles.
,ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONFLICTING EMPLOYMENT-One of two attor-
neys, who had offices together, was employed by a bankrupt and had con-
sulted the other concerning the bankruptcy proceedings. The other attorney
later accepted-a retainer to act for the creditors against the bankrupt, and his
failure to disclose to his clients his connection with the bankrupts attorney
was held to constitute professional misconduct deserving of severe censure.
In re Lichtenberger, z5o N. Y. Supp. 7 (1914),
The New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional
Ethics, in commenting upon a case in which the attorneys, who represented
the creditors, also represented the receiver in bankruptcy, but with the knowl-
edge of the creditors, said: "The Committee does not express any view at
present as to the propriety of an attorney for petitioning creditors assuming
also to represent the receiver," 61 U. oF P. L. R. 402 (1913). The Committee
however, expressed an opinion that when two partners were engaged by the
plaintiff and defendant in a suit respectively, each party, upon discovery of
the fact, was disqualified from acting for either of the parties in the con-
troversy. 62 U. OF P. L R. 54 (x9r3). (449)
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In Williams v. Reed, 3 Mason, 418 (U. S. 1824), Mr. Justice Story held
that every attorney owes to his client "the duty of a full, frank, and free
disclosure of every circumstance which may be presumed to be material to
the interests of the client." However, where an attorney accepted a retainer
to act for one who was about to make an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, having in his hands at the time for collection a claim against the
insolvent, a fact which escaped the memory of the attorney when he accepted
the retainer, this was held not to be such unprofessional conduct as justified
disbarment. In re Luce, 83 Cal. 3o3 (x89o).
BILLS AND Nos--CbLLAERAL SECURITY FOR ANTECEDENT DEBT-A bank
received a promissory note, before maturity and in good faith, as collateral
security for a pre-existing debt due from the indorser. Held: An antecedent
debt is a "valuable consideration," and the bank holds the note free from
defenses, such as fraud, which might have been available as between the
original parties. German-American State Bank v. Lyons, i49 N. W. Rep. 658
(Minn. 1914).
The court in the principal case reached its decision without reference to
the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which was adopted in
Minnesota in 1913, subsequent to the occurrence of the transaction. Prior
to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it was well established
in Pennsylvania, New York and several other jurisdictions that one who
acquired commercial paper as collateral security for an antecedent debt was
not a holder for value. Schaffer v. Fowler, IxI Pa. 451 (1886) ; Comstock v.
Hier, 73 N. Y. 269 (1878); Brooks v. Sullivan, i-9 N. C. igo (igoi). This
was in strict consistency with the doctrine that where a transfer is made or
security taken, the consideration of which is an antecedent debt, the transferee
or the person taking the security is not a purchaser for a valuable considera-
tion. People's Savings Bank v. Bates, 12o U. S. 565 (1886); Mingus v.
Condit, 23 N. J. Eq. 313 (1873). But the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized a distinction in favor of commercial paper, adopting the
doctrine that a bona fide holder taking a negotiable instrument in payment
of, or as security for, a pre-existing debt, is a holder for value entitled to
protection against all the equities existing between the original parties.
Railroad Co. v. National Bank, io2 U. S. 14 (i88o); Fisher v. Fisher,
98 Mass. 303 (1867); Rose mond v. Graham, 54 Minn. 323 (1893). This
exception to the general doctrine is grounded upon considerations of com-
mercial policy, and is limited to commercial paper. National Reserve Bank
v. Morse, 163 Mass. 383 (1895) ; National Bank v. Gas Light Co., 72 Conn.
576 (0oo).
The Negotiable Instruments Law, §25, expressly provides that "an ante-
cedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such whether the
instrument is payable on demand or at a future time." For cases applying
the statute, see Lowell v. Bickford. 201 Mass. 543 (r9o9) ; Graham v. Smith,
155 Mich. 65 (i9o8). The New York courts have put a narrow construction
upon this section of the act. Sutherland v. Mead, 8o App. Div. 103 (N. Y.
1903) ; Hover v. Magley, 96 N. Y. Supp. 925 (i9o5). These decisions have
been severely criticized by Mr. A. M. Eaton, in 27 Rep. of Am. Bar Ass. 68,
and 34 Rep. of Am. Bar Ass. IO34.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY-WHAT CoNsTlTus-An omission to
marry upon a particular day is not necessarily a breach of a promise of mar-
riage. Falk v. Burke, i43 Pac. Rep. 498 (Kan. 1914).
A mere postponement of a marriage for a reasonable cause does not
amount to a breach. Walters v. Stockbeyer, So N. E. Rep. 763 (Ind. 1898).
But where one fails to perform his agreement at the time fixed for the
ceremony, where no reasonable excuse exists for such failure, the other
party may consider the non-appearance as a breach. Waneck v. Krathy, 69
e-
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Neb. 770 (1903). Marriage by one of two engaged persons to a third person
is a breach that gives iinmcdiate ground for action. Sheahan v. Barry, 27
Mich. 217 (1873); Bracken.v. Dinning, 141 Ky. -65 (i91o). A breach may
be inferred from circumstances. Hubbard v. Bonsteel, 16 Barb. 36o (N. Y.
1853), such as wilful and persistent neglect of the person with whom a
contract to marry has been made. Wagenmaker v. Simmers, 97 Pa. 465
(i8r). Where the contract was not to be performed until a time subsequent
to the commencement of the suit, but before the suit was brought the defend-
ant renounced the contract, it was held that such renouncement constituted a
breach for which an action would lie. Kurtz v. Frank, 6 Ind. 594 (t88i),
Any conduct which amounts to a repudiation of the contract constitutes a
breach. Adams v. Byerly, 24 N. E. Rep. i;o (Ind. i8go).
As a contract to marry is coupled with the implied condition that both
parties shall remain in good health, if the condition of parties has so
changed that the marriage state would endanger the life or health of either,
a breach of the contract is excusable. Sanders v. Coleman, 34 S. E. Rep. 6z
(Va. 1899); Travis v, Schnebly, 122 Pac. Rep. 316 (Wash. 1912).
BURGLARY-WHAT CONSTITUTES BRtAxixGo-The door of a chicken house
was left open wide enough to permit the passage in and out of the owner,
and was held stationary by a brick and a post placed against it on either
side. The defendant, in entering, was compelled to move the post and brick
and increase the width of the opening. Held: This was sufficient breaking
to render the subsequent entry burglarious. Goins v. State, 107 N, E. Rep.
335 (Ohio, 1914).
While the earlier cases uniformly held that the mere raising of a closed
window or the turning of a door-knob constituted sufficient breaking for the
crime of burglary. Rex v. Hyams, 7 Car. & P. 441 (Eng. 1836); State v.
Reid. 2o Ia. 413 (1866) ; the line was arbitrarily drawn at the case where a
window or door was partly open and the opening had to be enlarged to per-
mit entry. Rex v. Smith, I Moody, Cr. Cas. 178 (Eng. 1821). The reason
given was that there must be something put aside which was relied upon as
security against intrusion, and that leaving a door or a window open showed
such negligence as to forfeit all claim to the peculiar protection extended to
dwelling houses. State v. Boon, 35 N. C. 244 (1852). Aside from the fact
that the propriety of the recognition of contributory negligence as a defense
in criminal law is questionable, it would seem that a window partly open,
though perhaps more inviting to a thief, is quite as great an obstacle to entry
as one that is closed and not fastened. This is the attitude distinctly adopted
by a few of the more modern cases, which rejeat the "useless refinement!'
sanctioned in the earlier decisions. Claiborne v. State, 113 Tenn. --,6i (19o4) ;
People v. White, 153 Mich. 617 (i9o8); pushing open door of freight car
already ajar. State v. Lapoint, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 717 (Vt. 1913). While
the principal case lays down the broad general rule of these later cases, that
the additional fact, zizc., that the fastenings (brick and post) were removed,
might constitute a breaking seems not to have been considered.
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF LivE STocK-BURDEN OF PRooF-Where a common
carrier accepts a shipment of live stock and the owner agrees to accompany
his shipment, the burden of proof is on said owner to show that injury to the
animals was not the result of his own negligence but of that of the carrier.
Mix v. ChL, M. & St. P. Ry, Co., r49 N. W. Rep. 727 (S. D. z9r4).
Among the exceptions to a carrier's common law liability as an insurer
is that for injuries due to the inherent nature of the goods shipped. Moore.
Carriers, p. Sg; authorities cited. For such injuries the, carrier is no more
liable than for injury due to act of God. But in the case of live stock, the
burden of proof is on carrier to prove that injur7 arose from the nature and
propensities of the animals themsdves; such as kicking, smothering, or "piling
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up." Ry. Co. v. "Voodward, 164-Ind. 360 (90o4). This is on the ground that
carrier has control over the animals and therefore is better able to locate the
cause of death or injury. Hutchinson, Carriers, 3rd ed., §1357. And in such
a case delivery to the carrier and arrival at destination in injured condition
will be prima facie evidence that the injury arose from some cause for which
the carrier was responsible. Boehl v. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 191 (i8go).
But where the shipper accompanies the live stock for the purpose of
looking after them, the reason for the rule holding the carrier liable no longer
exists. The shipper now, and not the carrier, has control and the oppor-
tunity to ascertain- the cause of the injury. To recover in such a case the
shipper must not only show himself free from negligence but also prove a
breach of duty by the carrier. Norfolk & Western v. Reeves & McNeil, 97
Va. 284 (i899); Colsch v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry., 149 Iowa, 176 (igIo). The
question of .who has control -is the determining element in fixing the burden
of proof. Thus where the shipper had agreed to ride in the caboose merely.
the burden was still on the carrier to prove injury from the inherent nature
of the goods, Fast v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry., 104 Iowa, 241 (1897). Nor
in the principal case is the shipper excused by having ridden only part way
in the cattle car. Weaver v. Southern R., ii Ga. App. 355 (1913). He had
agreed to go the entire way and the train conductor had no right to waive
this part of the "tct..
CONSTTUTIONAL LANw-IMPAIRING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONs-R-EvOK-
ING UNEXERCISED FRANcHisE-The New York Electric Lines Co. was
incorporated under a general law of New York to lay electric conductors
under ground in the streets of New York City and Brooklyn upon securing
permission from the common councils of those cities. Such permission was
granted by the Common Council of New York in 1883. Inventions and patent
rights were secured, as well as an office and factory, but nothing was done
with regard to the actual construction of conduits or laying of wires. The
city revoked its permission in i9b6. Th" corporation claimed that it was the
grantee of an irrevocable franchise in the ity's streets. Held: The right
conferred, assuming it to be a contract right, was to be used within a reason-
able time or lost. The city was justified in revoking its grant because of
nonuser. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co., 235
U. .S. 179 (1914).
An ordinance, such as the one here passed, is a grant of a property right.
Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U. S. S8 (1912); and so, as a
general rule, is not subject to revocation. Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co.,
x58 N. Y. 5To (x899). These grants, however, rest upon obligations, expressly
or impliedly, assumed to carry on the undertakings to which they relate.
Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 646 (z895): and it is a tacit
condition annexed to them that they may be lost by misuser; Chicago Life
Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574 (iS85); or nonuser. Daviess County v.
Dickinson, i17 U. S. 657 (1886). Although the franchise is a property right,
it is subject to defeasance or forfeiture by failure to exercise it. People v.
Broadway R. Co.. 126 N. Y. 29 (i8i); or by subsequent abandonment after
it has been-exercised. People v. Albany & Vermont R. Co., 24 N. Y. 261
(z862). The time within which a corporation must begin business after its
organization is often provided by statute. Commonwealth v. Reliance Safe
Dep. & Trust Co., 242 Pa. 177 (913). Where no definite period of time is
specified, the franchise must be exercised within a reasonable time. New
York v. Bryan, 196 N. Y. i.58 (19o9). So in the principal case it was held
that a reasonable time had elapsed and that consequently the corporation had
lost its corporate rights by nonuser.
CONTRACTS-INFANCY-EFFECT OF KNOWLEDGE Rm GULARDIAN-The plain-
tiff, while an infant, purchased an automobile of the defendant for $37_-
RECENT CASES
llis guardian knew and consented to the purchase and furnished funds from
the ward's estate for that purpose. The defendant knew of the plaintiff's
infancy. On attaining his majority, the plaintiff returned the car and
demanded refund of the $375. Held: Plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Reynolds v. Garber-Buick Co., 149 N. W. Rep. 985 (Mich. x914).
The general rule is that an infant, on becoming of age, may rescind his
contract of purchase (except for necessaries) and recovcr back the purchase
money paid, at least if he offers to restore the consideration which he has
received. Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 126 N. W. Rep. 5o (Wis.
xgio); Tower-Doyle Commission Co. v. Smith, 86 Mo. App. 490 (9oo).
The vendor is not entitled to recoup for the use of the property while in the
possession of the minor. Gillis v. Goodwin, i8o Mass. 140 (igot) ; although
there are a few cases which hold that an infant should not be allowed to
rescind a contract of which he has had the benefit without accounting for
such benefit and for the deterioration in value of the property while in
his possession. Rice v. Butler, 55 N. E. Rep. (N. Y. i889); Johnson V.
Northwestern Life Insurance Co., 56 Minn. 365 (i894). If the infant no
longer possesses the consideration received by him, having consumed or
disposed of it during infancy, lie may avoid the contract without putting the
other party in stalou quo. Craig v. Van Bebber, ioo Mo. 584 (x889); First
National Bank v. Casey, 38 N. W. Rep. 897 (Iowa, 1912). Nor will his right be
affected by the fact that the property has depreciated in value while in his
possession, by reason of use or otherwise. Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79
(1878). For reasons of public policy, a guardian has no authority whatever
to bind either the person or the estate of his ward by contract unless
expressly authorized by statute. Aborn v. Janis, 62 Misc. Rep. 95 (N. Y.
19o9); Shephard v. Hanson, 9 N. D. 249 (igoo); McKee v. Hunt, x42 Cal.
526 (i9o4). In accordance with the principal case, therefore, the guardian's
mere knowledge of a contract entered into by his ward should have no effect
upon the infant's right to avoid the contract at maturity.
ComAcTs-RFscissioN FOR FRAuD-RESTITUTiox--The plaintiff pur-
chased the business and property of the defendant. Having been induced to
make the purchase by fraudulent misrepresentations, he rescinded the pur-
chase and tendered the business and property back to the defendant in sub-
stantially the same condition as when taken over by him. The plaintiff
conducted the business from the time of the purchase until the time of the
trial. Held: If the plaintiff is still able to turn the business back to the
defendant in substantially the same condition as when he took it over, also
the profits derived therefromi, he is entitled to recover the consideration with
which he parted. Clark v. Wells, 149 N. W. Rep. 545 (Minn. 1914).
A party who would rescind a contract on the ground of fraud must
return whatever of value he has received upon the contract from the opposite
party, that they may be placed in statu quo. Cooley v. Harper, 4 Ind. 455
(1853) ; Mortimer v. McMullen, 2o2 Ill. 413 (903). Rescission must be
in toto; a party to a contract cannot rescind it on the ground of fraud, and
at the same time retain a benefit from its partial execution by his co-
contractor. Russell v. Russell, 63 N. J. Eq. 282 (1901). If a contract has
been partly performed by the party in default, the other party, at least if he
has received any benefit from such part performance, cannot ordinarily
rescind the contract, according to the English law. Even though he return
what he has received, it is said the parties cannot be restored to their original
position, because lie has had the temporary enjoyment of the property. Hunt
v. Silk, 5 East, 449 (Eng. i8o4); Lagurgas Nitrate Co. v. Lagurgas Syndi-
cate [i899] 2 Ch. D. 392. See also Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 3rd ed. 342.
The American authorities are more liberal and tend to allow rescission of
the contract, although the parties cannot be placed in stattu quo, if substan-
tial justice can be worked out. Marple v. M. & St. L. Ry. Co., ii5 Minn. 262
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(1911). Thus if the defrauded person. by reason of the wrongful conduct of
the other party, is rendered incapable of fully restoring the latter to his
former position, to that extent such restoration is not necessary to a rescis-
sion of such sale or agreement. Gates v. Raymond, io6 Wis. 657 (1900);
Wright v. Haskell, 45 Me. 489 (1858). Where one agrees to teach another
a certain thing, and, after beginning the course of instruction, refuses to
proceed further, the other party may treat the contract as rescinded and
bring suit to recover the amount which lie has paid under the agreement.
Timmerman v. Stanley, 123 Ga. 85o (Ipo5). Likewise, it has been held that a
contract may be rescinded and restitution made of the consideration in spite
of benefits derived from temporary possession and deterioration due to use.
Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Marsh, 2o Colo. 22 (1894).
CRIMINAL PROCEiuRE-Ex'rRADITIoN-SUFFICIENCY OF PAPERs-The de-
fendant having escaped from a New York State hospital for insane criminals
and fled to another state, was indicted for conspiring to effect such an escape
and his extradition -sought. The defendant brought habeas corpus proceedings
to prevent extradition and the writ was. granted by the lower court which held,
inter alia, that, as the extradition papers showed on their face that the
accused had been confined for insanity, therefore he could not be guilty of
the crime charged therein, for the reason that the insanity would be presumed
to continue in the absence of contrary evidence. ix parte Thaw, 214 Fed.
Rep. 424 (1914). The Supreme Court of the United States, however, in a
recent decision. reached the conclusion that, since "the identity of the person,
the fact that he is a fugitive from justice, the demand in due form, the indict-
ment by a grand jury for what it and the Governor of New York allege to
be a crime in that State, and the reasonable possibility that it may be such,
all appear" extradition was not interfered with merely because of "specula-
tions as to what ought to be the result of a trial" in the state in which the
offence took place. Drew v. Thaw, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137 (1914). This decision
establishes a precedent. For a discussion of the subject, see 63 U. OF P. L. R.
123 (Dec. 1914).
CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE-RIGHT To APPEAL-WAIER BY PAYMENT OP FINE-
A corporation which has voluntarily paid a fine imposed upon it after an
indictment and conviction for violation of a statute, has thereby waived its
right to appeal. State v. Wells, i49 N. W. Rep. 286 (Minn. 1914).
In civil cases, by the weight of authority, a defendant does not waive
his right to appeal from a judgment against him by paying that judgment,
whether voluntarily or otherwise. Nashville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bean, i28 Ky.
758 (19o8) ; Lott v. Davis, 262 I1. 148 (1914). The analogy is strong between
such cases and the criminal cases in which the defendant has paid a fine
imposed upon him; nevertheless, though the decisions are somewhat conflict-
ing, the view of a majority of jurisdictions is that if the defendant has paid
the fine voluntarily, lie has ihereby waived his right to appeaL White v. City
of Tifton, I Ga. App. 569 (I9o7); Eutsler v. Com., i54 Ky. 35 (1913). In
State v. Westfall, 37 la. 575 (1873), the court said, "If the judgment in this
case had been one of imprisonment, and the defendants had served out the
period of imprisonment, it seems clear that they could not afterward prose-
cute an appeal from the judgment, for the reason that they could derive no
benefit from a reversal. By voluntarily paying a fine imposed upon them they
stand in the same relation to the law as they would have done if they had
served their period of imprisonment." The court supposed that a reversal
would be of no benefit to the defendants because they could not recover back
the amount of the fine. "Of far more importance, however," it is said in.
People v. Marks, i2o N. Y. Supp. I1O6 (I9o9), "ii the defendant's right to
be relieved of the odium and disgrace of a conviction." In the words of-Mr.
Justice Holmes in Com. v. Fleckner, 167 Mass. 13 (1896), "We should be
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slow to suppose that the legislature meant to take away the right to undo the
disgrace and legal discredit of a conviction merely because a wrongly con-
victed person has paid his fine or served his term." The last two cases,
therefore, hold that the payment of the fine imposed on him does not impair
the defendant's right of appeal. There is other authority to the same effect.
Johnson'v. State, 172 Ala. 424 (igi). On the other hand, some cases go to
the opposite extreme and hold that even where the defendant pays his fine
u.nder protest, he thereby waives his right of appeal. Town of Batesburg v.
Mitchell, 58 S. C. 564 (igoo); State v. Conkling, 54 Kan. so8 (1894). The
ground for this, as stated in the latter case, is that "the sentence of the law
has been executed, and nothing is left for further controversy."
In those jurisdictions which hold that a payment of the fine, to bar an
appeal, must be voluntary, there is some confusion as to what constitutes a
voluntary payment. The payment of a fine as an alternative to imprisonment
has been held to be a voluntary payment. White v. City of Tifton, i Ga. App.
$69 (1907). Contra, Oberer v. State, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 620 (i9o4). The
giving of a note or mortgage as security for the payment of a fine is not
such a payment as will satisfy the judgment and preclude the defendant from
his right to appeal. Com. v. Bass, i3 Va. 76o (x912). The judgment must
be satisfied in full; therefore, if the fine only is paid in a sentence of fine
and imprisonment, the defendant is not prevented from prosecuting an
appeal. State v. Swikert, 65 Ore. 286 (1913).
DoWER-PRoFCTION OF INCHOATz RIGHT-No bill to restrain the grantee
of the husband alone from committing waste, lies at the instance of the wife
in her husband's lifetime, where the grantee opened and operated, even to
exhaustion, oil and gas wells, which constituted the chief value of property
owned by the husband after marriage. Curtis v. Davidson, ISo N. Y. Supp.
287 (1914).
Dower, while specially guarded by the law, has always been recognized
as a right to the enjoyment of part of the husband's property, merely
inchoate during his life. Mason v. Mason, 140 Mass. 63 (x885); Bonfoey
v. Bonfoey, ioo Mich. 84 (1894). It becomes consummate only upon the
death of the husband and survival of the wife. Best v. Jenks, x23 I1. 447
(1888). But, even during the life of the husband, the wife may protect her
inchoate right, in apt cases. Brown v. Brown, 88 At. Rep. 86 (N. J. i913),
62 U. oF P. L R. 317 (1913). So she may redeem a mortgage on her hus-
band's property, Davis v. Wetherill, 13 Allen, 60 (Mass. 1866); Bonfoey v.
Bonfoey, supra; or bring a bill to prevent fraudulent conveyance prejudicial
to her right, Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383 (1895); Brown v. Brown,
94 S. C. 492 (1913).
That the widow has dower rights in oil and gas wells opened before she
comes into possession cannot be doubted. Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17 (1888) ;
Sayers v. Hoskinson, 1lo Pa. 473 (1888). There are strong dicta to the
effect that the widow, although having the right of the life tenant to work
opened mines, etc.. may not open new ones. Stoughton v. Leigh, x Taunt.
402 (Eng. i8o8); Coates v. Cheever, x Cowen, 46D (N. Y. 1823). A con-
trary rule was asserted in a Michigan case, where the mine was opened after
death of the husband, but before assignment of dower, and where the land
was good for mining purposes only. Seager v. McCabe, 92 Mich. x86 (x893).
While, however, the wife has a dower interest in at least such gas or oil
wells as may be in operation at her husband's death, this is not conclusive
of her right to bring bill for waste against her husband's grantee. The
grantee from the husband alone takes full title to the land, except that dower
is outstanding. Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. Rep. io3o (Mo. 194); Overturf v.
Martin, 17o Ind. 308 (1907). There appears to be no case in which the 1s-
band was restrained from exhausting the natural resources which may make
his land valuable. His grantee, who succeeds to all his rights,, has likewise
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not been restrained while the husband was alive. Boling v. Clark, 83 Ia. 481
(i8gi); Williams v. Williams, 89 Ky. 381 (1889). Contra to these last two
cases cited and to the principal case is Brown v. Brown, 94 S. C. 492 (1913).
EVIDENE-ADMISSIONS-PARTIES JOINTLY INTERESTED--A husband and
wife, being joint owners of an estate, in consideration of services rendered
by their son, jointly and severally promised to devise the property to him.
The husband having died, the wife devised the land to a third party, who,
with' the wife, is a defendant in this suit. Held: Admissions of the hus-
band, made out of the presence of the wifei are admissible. Gifford v.
Gifford, 107 N. E Rep. 308 (Ind. 19f4).
The principle case is in accord with the well established rule that admis-
sions of one of several parties having a joint interest or priority of design are
admissible against the others, Barrick v. Austin, 21 Barb. 24z (N. Y. i855);
Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U. S. 73 (1886). A familiar illustration of the
application of this rule is in the case of partners, Western Assurance Co. v.
Towle, 65 Wis. 247 (1886), which in a number of these cases seems to be
grounded on the theory that each partner is the agent of the others. Fickett
v. Swift, 41 Me. 65 (x856); Collett v. Smith, 143 Mass. 474 (1886). But
such statements are admitted in the case of parties jointly interested even
where no agency is present, as in the case of joint makers of a promissory
note. Bound v. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336 (1822) ; Cooper v. Hocking Valley Nat.
Bank, 21 Ind. App. 58 (1898). The mere fact that parties without joint
interest are co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, however, does not per se render
admissible against one the statements of another. Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves.
Jr. 355 (Eng. 18o6); 2 Wigmore on Evid., §io76. The admissions of a
co-conspirator made in the furtherance of the common object, have also
been held competent, Wilborg v. United States, 163 U. S. 632 (x89s), and
this has likewise been justified on the theory of agency. Reg. v. O'Connell,
5 State Tr. (N. S.) 1, 711 (Eng. 1843). It is universally held, however,
that the mere fact that a community of interest exists among several per-
sons, as distinguished from a joint interest, will not render such admissions
competent. King v. Gilson, 191 Mo. 307 (1905); admissions of one of sev-
eral legatees under a will. Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. 323 (Pa. 1825).
As emphasized in the principal case, before such statements are admissible,
the joint obligation, partnership, or other relationship must be prima facie
established by evidence aliunde, and the admissions are not competent to
establish this joint relationship. Dutton v. Woodman, 9 Cush. 255 (Mass.
1852) ; Smith v. Collins, 115 Mass. 388 (1874); Walker v. Tupper, i52 Pa. i
(1892).
EVIDENcE-VALUE OF LAND-OTHER SALES OF SIMILA PROPERTY-A
petitioner for an assessment of damages for land taken for a public use
cannot introduce in evidence a sale of neighboring land made by him to a
corporation of which he was an officer, unless he shows that the price was
unaffected by his relations with the corporation. Burley v. Old Colony Ry.
Co., io7 N. E. Rep. 365 (Mass. 1914).
It is well settled ii most jurisdictions that, where the value of land is
in issue, evidence of actual sales of similar lands in the neighborhood is
competent. Paine v. Boston, 4 Allen, 168 (Mass.'i862); Chicago, etc., R. R.
Co. v. Emery, St Kan. x6. (1893); with the provision, made in the principal
case, that the sales are voluntary, fair and open. O'Malley v. Common-
wealth, 182 Mass. 196 (r.o9); Metropolitan St. Rwy. Co. v. Walsh, i97 Mo.
392 (i9o6). It is generally left to the trial court's discretion to determine
the substantial similarity between the property concerning which the proof
is offered and the property involved, and the nearness in respect of time
and distance. Sawyer v. Boston, 144 Mass. 470 (1887); Haines Y. Insurance
Company, 52 N. H. 467 (1872). To render proof of sales competent they
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must be for money and not by way of'exchange in whole or in part, Illings-
worth v. Des Moines and St. Louis Rwy. Co., 63 Ia. 443 (1884) ; and must
of course be voluntary and not forced sales., Mayor of Baltimore v. Smith
Brick Co., 8o Md. 458 (i895). In general, it may be said that if the evidence
is remote or conjectural, or unnecessarily complicates the issue, it will be
excluded, though logically probative. Thayer's Prelim. Treat- Evidence, 5x6-
58.
In Pennsylvania and a few other jurisdictions, evidence of particular sales
to establish market value is wholly incompetent. Pittsburgh & Vestern
R. R. Co. v. Patterson, 107 Pa. 461 (Y884) ; Stinson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co,
27 Minn. 284 (i88o). The total exclusion of such evidence is based on the
ground that it involves a disproportionate confusion of issues and loss of
time. Petition of Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463 (t89i) ; Gorgas v. R. R. Co.,
64 At. Rep. 68o (Pa. xgo6). In these states, a, witness cannot be interro-
gated in chief as to the money values of particular properties sold. all
questions as to other sales being confined to the cross-examination. In re
East 16xst Street, 144 N. Y. Supp. 717 (1913); Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa.
593 ()910-
FALSE IMPRISON MENT-WHEN PRocass PTocrs OicErR-The defendant
arrested the plaintiff on a warrant charging him with selling intoxicating
liquor in violation of the local option law. The warrant was-defective in
that it did not state the names of the persons to whom the liquor had been
sold. Held: The process was a protection to the defendant in an action for
false imprisonment as it issued from a court having authority to issue process
of that nature, it was legal in form, and the defect therein was not such a
one as to notify or fairly apprise the officer that it was issued without
authority. Brown v. Radwin, Sheriff, 148 N. W. Rep. 693 (Mich. 1914).
The process that shall protect an officer must be fair on its face. Kelsey
v. Klabunde, 54 Neb. 76o (i898). This does not mean that it shall appear to
be perfectly regular, and in all respects in accord with proper practice, and
after the most approved form; but what is intended is, that it shall apparently
be process lawfully issued, and such as the officer might lawfully serve.
Cooley on Torts (3d ed.), 883. Where the warrant is invalid or void on its
face, as where it showed on its face that the justice who issued it had no
jurisdiction, the officer making an arrest thereunder, is liable in damages .for
false imprisonment. Heller v. Clarke, 98 N. W. Rep. 952 (Wis. i9o4). How-
ever, for reasons founded on public policy, and in order to secure a prompt
and effective service of legal process, if there is no defect or want of juris-
diction apparent on the face of the warrant, and if it is in due form, the
officer is not bound to look beyond the warrant. In such case, he may justify
under it although in fact it may have been issued without authority, and
therefore be wholly void. Rush v. Buckley, Ioo Me. 322 (9o5); Wheaton v.
Beecher, 49 Mich. 348 (1882). Thus, when a court which has general juris-
diction with respect to the violation of the ordinances of the town, enter-
tains a complaint under such an ordinance, and thereupon issues process, fair
on its face, to an officer, the process is a justification to the officer in doing
the acts thereby required, notwithstanding the ordinance under which the
court acts is invalid. Hofschulte v. Doe, 78 Fed. Rep. 436 (897). But, if
the statute under which the process issues is unconstitutional, the weight of
authority is that the officer is not protected. Sumer v. Beeler, So Ind. 34!
(1875); Warren v. Keeley, 8o Me. 512 (1888). Contra, Williams v. Morris,
22 Ohio C. C. 453 (1911).
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT---"DEPENDENT"-An employee of a
railroad while at his work was struck and killed by a train of his employer.
Held: Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act a sister of deceased, who
upon the trial establishes that the deceased contributed to her support by
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gift of money, by payment of her board and otherwise, is "dependent" on him
ven though possessed of property and having a position which in part sup-
ports her. Richelieu v. Union Pac. R. Co., z49 N. W. Rep. 772 (Neb. 1914).
To make one a "dependent", he or she must have been actually dependent
upon deceased. Collins v. Ry. Co., i48 N. Y. S. 777 (1914); Miller v. Ry.
Co., 85 Atl. Rep. o3o (N. J. 1913). Mere loss of occasional gift is insuffi-
cient to make one a dependent. Ry. v. Doherty, 153 S. V. Rep. 1119
(Ky. 1913). A mere fact that the decedent was legally bound to support
the claimant will not make said claimant a dependent upon deceased, 133
Pac. Rep. 6og (Wash. 1913). A deserted wife of a deceased employee was
not a dependent upon him unless she received actual support from him.
Batista v. R. R. Co., 88 At. Rep. 954 (N. J. 1913). A father is not dependent
on a son where, after son's death, the father supported himself and wife
and saved three dollars per week. Dazy v. Mfg. Co., 89 Atl. Rep. i6o
(R. 1. 1914). A brother of deceased, who was sick and unable to work,
is not a dependent unless it is shown that deceased contributed to his sup-
port. Jones v. Ry Co., 82 S. E. Rep. 415 (N. C. 1914). Evidence that
sisters of decedent were of tender age and without estate made a question
for the jury as to whether they were dependent upon deceased. Kensey v.
Railroad Co., 82 S. E. Rep. 968 (N. C. 1914). Whether a claimant was a
dependent of the deceased is a question of fact. In re Herrick, xo4 N. E.
Rep. 432 (Mass. 1914).
FEDERAL EMPLOYERs' LIABILITY AcT-VHEN SERVANT IS ENGAGED IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-A workman was engaged in building a bridge on a
cut-off which when completed was to be used in interstate and intrastate
commerce. On his way home from work while riding in a hand car he was
injured. Held: The workman was not engaged in interstate commerce within
the Employers' Liability Act. Bravis v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 217
Fed. Rep. 234 (1914).
A complaint alleged that the plaintiff was injured "while . . . em-
ployed . . . operating a steam shovel . . . in the removal of earth
from the road-bed and tracks of" a railroad engaged in interstate commerce,
and that the plaintiff was employed "in the repair and maintenance of the
tracks and road-bed which were employed for the transportation and move-
ment of defendant's trains in the conduct of its business." Held: This states
a cause of action within the Federal Employers' Liability Act because the
averments show that the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce. Tralich
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 217 Fed. Rep. 675 (I914).
A conductor had been employed in intrastate commerce on one day. On
the succeeding day he was injured while in charge of an engine and a
caboose making an interstate trip. Held: He was not injured while engaged
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. McAuliffe v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., i5o N. Y. Supp. 512 (1914).
These three cases show the difficulty which the courts are obliged to
face when an action is brought by a railroad employee who has been injured
while on duty. Whether or not the injury was sustained in interstate com-
merce must be first decided in every such case because the Federal Employers'
Liability Act does not give a right of action in addition to that of the state,
but it supersedes all state laws and if the injury occurred in interstate com-
merce recovery can be predicated on the federal act alone. Wabash R. R.
v. Hayes, 234-U. S. 86 (1914). In the nature of things it is impossible to
lay down a hard and fast rule as to what is and what is not interstate com-
merce, but the frequency with which cases of this sort arise has compelled
the courts to formulate tests of some kinds. If the employee at the time
of his injury is not immediately engaged in commerce of hny kind, yet is on
duty for the railroad, he will not be denied recovery but he will be con-
sidered as engaged in that commerce, interstate or intrastate, with which
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his work is most directly connected, or if not working at the time, in that
in which he was last engaged or that in which he is immediately about to
engage. Thus a fireman who has prepared his engine for an interstate trip
is engaged in interstate commerce even before the train leaves the station.
Nor. Car. R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 (1914). This is in accord
with the Bravis case, supra, where the employee was injured while returning
from work in interstate commerce. On the question of how intimately the
work being done at the time of the injury must be connected with interstate
commerce in order to make the employee engaged in interstate commerce,
there seems to be no well defined rule. Carrying materials to repair a bridge
over which interstate commerce passes is interstate commerce. Pedersen
v. D., L & W. R. R., 229 U. S. 146 (1913). But if the employee is at the
time of the injury performing work which is not in. furtherance of the inter-
state commerce of his employer, the fact that he has previously or will shortly
engage in interstate commerce does not bring him within the provisions of
the act. Ill. Cen. P. R. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473 (1914).
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CoDE-An amendment passed by Congress on Decem-
ber 23, 1914, gives to the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction
over all cases carried to a State court of last resort in which a federal right is
involved. Public Act No. 224; 63d Congress, Senate Bill No. 94; amending
c. 1o, §237, of Federal Judicial Code. Prior to the enactment of this pro-
vision, only those cases in which the federal right was denied were entitled
to review, whereas now this line has been abolished. The added power con-
ferred, however, is to be exercised at the discretion of the Supreme Court,
and the losing litigant in the court below is not entitled to a certiorari as a
matter of right as is the case when an asserted federal right has been denied.
It remains to be seen to what extent this new power of the Supreme Court
will be exercised.
The reasons for the adoption of this amendment are clear. When the
Judiciary Act first went into effect in 1789, State feeling ran high. If a
federal right were upheld in a State court, the same result was practically
assured to be reached by the federal courts. Most of the controversies which
arose were those in which State interests were involved, and the State courts
disclosed a strong tendency in favor of their own laws. Accordingly, there
would have been-but little point in requiring the Supreme Court to pass upon
a case which had been decided for one claiming under the constitution or
laws of the United States.
Today, however, local prejudice and jealousy of the national governmeit
have largely disappeared, and there is even among the judiciary of some
States a strong national sentiment, tending to influence their decisions in
favor of those who claim under federal laws. Such a change in sentiment
is good reason for a change in law. But by far the most important reason
for the amendment is the prevalent idea that the Supreme Court should be
the final interpreter of the Federal Constitution and laws made in pursuance
thereof. Heretofore. this has been true only when the State courts have
upheld State laws and rights claimed thereunder in opposition to federal laws.
There will no longer be an opportunity for finding a statute of one State
striken down by its courts as contrary to the Federal Constitution while an
enactment of another State exactly similar in its purport is upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE-ADVicE ov
CouNSEL-A taxpayer, relying on the advice of a reputable attorney, and
with the assistance of the district prosecutor, instituted an action to prevent
a sale of land to the county on the ground of fraud. The suit was dis-
missed because the fraud alleged was not sufficiently established. Held: The
vendor cannot recover for malicious prosecution against the taxpayer, even
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though the latter acted maliciously, if he had probable cause for believing
that fraud existed; but even if there were probable cause, the vendor can
recover against the taxpayer and the attorneys, upon proof of collusion
between them to injure him, resulting in actual damage. Reichert v. Neacy
et al., 147 N. W. Rep. 586 (Wis. '914).
It is well established that the plaintiff in an action for malicious prose-
cution must prove the absence of probable cause on the part of the defendant
in prosecuting, though the defendant may have been malicious, though the
prosecution terminated in the present plaintiff's favor, and though the latter
may have sustained damage. Frisbie v. Morris, 75 Conn. 637 (x9o3); Shat-
tuck v. Simonds, 191 Mass. 5o6 (i9o6); Cahoon v. Hogan, 31 Utah, 74 (19o6).
In Heyne v. Blair, 62 N. Y. i9 (1875), the term "probable cause" was defined
as "such a state of facts and circumstances as would lead a man of ordinary
caution and prudence" to believe that he had a cause of action. Accord:
Ravenga v. Mackintosh. 2 B & C. 693 (Eng. 1824) ; Flam v. Lee, i16 Ia. 2S9
(9o2-). But see Munns v.'duPont de Nemours, 3 Wash. C. C. 31 (18ix);
Ash v. Marlow, 20 Ohio, iig (853). It is fairly well settled that when the
prosecutor submits the facts to a lawyer, who advises that they are legally
sufficient, and the prosecutor acts the'eon in good faith, such advice shows
probable cause. McClaferty v. Philp, 15i Pa. 86 (1892); Van Meter v. Bass,
40 Col.-78 (19o7). It has, however, been occasionally held that advice of an
attorney, if clearly erroneous, constitutes no defense in an action of malicious
prosecution, on the ground that every man is bound to know the law, Hazard
v. Fluny, i2o N. Y. 223 (i89o); Lange v. Ill. Cent. Rwy., 107 La. 687 (1902);
though it may be considered in mitigation of damages. Mortimer v. Thomas,
23 La. Ann. x65 (187i).
The advice of an attorney, to constitute proof of probable cause, must
be given and acted upon in good faith and without collusion. Watt v. Corey,
76 Me. 87 (1884); Hamilton v. Smith, 39 Mich. 222 (1878). The decision
in the principal case that if an attorney combine with a client for the pur-
pose of injuring another, instead of vindicating a right, even though there
be probable cause for the action, the parties so combining will be liable, if
damage has resulted, is.in harmony with the general rule as to civil liability
for conspiracy. In Place v. Minster, 65 N. Y. 89 (1875), it was said that the
essence of conspiracy, so far as it justifies a civil action for damages, is"a concert or combination to defraud or to cause other injury to person or
property, which actually results in damage to the person or property of the
person injured or defrauded". Such a concert or combination differs widely
from an invasion of civil rights by an individual. Quinn v. Leathem [r9oi]
App. Cas. 495; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310 (1894).
MARRIACE-ANNVLIENT-FRAUD CONCERNING H. ALtn-A man, prior to
his marriage, represented to his fiancee that certain symptoms which he dis-
played were manifestations of.a cold. He knew, however, that he was suffer-
ing from tuberculosis for which he had previously been treated. Within a
few days after their marriage, his condition was such as to require the
attention of a physician, who diagnosed it as incurable consumption. The
wife ceased to cohabit with him, immediately after the diagnosis, and shortly
afterwards brought an action for annulment. The court, taking into con-
sideration the probable effect upon the offspring, and also emphasizing as
a potent factor for its decision (though inconsistent with the reason just
stated) that no children were begotten of the marriage, granted an annul-
ment. Sobol v. Sobol, 15o N. Y. Supp. z48 (1914).
As stated in the principal case, it is a general rule that any misrepre-
sentation of a material fact incidental to the contract of marriage is sufficient
to avoid it, if, in the exercise of the court's discretion, based upon considera-
tions of public policy, such misrepresentation is deemed of sufficient import-
ance. Concealment of the prenuptial insanity of a woman, who was sane at
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the time of her marriage, has been held insufficient ground for annulment,
although there was a possibility that she might again become insane. Cum-
mington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223 (1899). So, also, where a woman
falsely represented that she had had no epileptic attack for eight years and
that she had been cured of epilepsy, the court refused to annul the marriage.
Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366 (19o7); contra, Gould v. Gould. 78 Conn. 242
(19o5), in which case concealment of epilepsy was held sufficient, in view of
a statute which prohibited the marriage of an epileptic. Concealment of
antenuptial pregnancy by another man is fraud for which annulment will
be decreed, provided that the husband had no improper relations with the
woman before he married her. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 57 N. J. Eq. 2= (z898);
contra, Moss v. Moss, 72 Law Times, 22o (Eng. 1897). In Pennsylvania, it
is a question for the jury whether such concealment is fraud. Allen's Appeal,
99 Pa. 196 (i881).
It has been held that the concealment of a venereal disease, existing at
the time of marriage, is a ground for annulment. Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass.
404 (1898); Svenson v. Svenson, 178 N. Y. 54 (i9o4), in which case the
defendant had practically recovered at the time of the application for annul-
ment. In Vondal v. Vondal, 175 Mass. 383 (19oo), annulment was refused
on the ground that there had been a cohabitation of four months and that
the disease, at time of suit, was not contagious, although offspring would
probably be affected. Where a woman, suffering from a female ailment,
sought marriage as a cure, annulment was granted. Meyer v. Meyer, 49
How. Pr. 311 (N. Y. 1875). As to the effect of physical incapacity, see 6a
U. or P. L R. 392.
It is believed that the decision of the principal case establishes a pre-
cedent. The question as to whether concealment of tuberculosis was ground
for annulment arose in Gumbiner v. Gumbiner, 72 Misc. 211 (N. Y. 1911).
A decree was refused for the reason that, although the defendant declared,
three years before his marriage, that he was perfectly well, when in fact he
had symptoms of tuberculosis and had been treated therefor, nevertheless he
had enjoyed periods of good health after the misrepresentation until three
years after his marriage, when his health declined and he was pronounced
to be suffering from tuberculosis.
MUNICIPAL CORPOATION-ADVMESE PossErssioN-A testator devised land
to a city and provided that it was to be rented but not sold, and the proceeds
devoted to the support of schools for the poor. Held: Land owned by a
municipality, which is not actually used for public purposes, although its
revenues may be so used, is subject to alienation and may be privately
acquired by adverse possession. City of New Orleans v. Salem Brick Co.
66 So. Rep. 237 (La. 1914).
This case follows the general rule that municipal corporations do not
enjoy the immunity which states do against prescription, Evans v. Erie Co.,
66 Pa. 222 (1870; Lumber Co. v. Craig, 14 S. W. Rep. f3 (Mo. 1913); San
Francisco v. Straut, 84 Cal. 124 (i89o); except in the case of municipal
property devoted to public use, which cannot be adversely acquired. Hardin
County v. Nona Co., 112 S. W. Rep. 822 (Tex. i9o8); Board of Education
v. Martin, 92 Cal. 2o9 (i89x). Thus municipal property not held for the
common use may be acquired by prescription; Hammond v. Shepard, 57 N. E.
867 (I1. z9oo); Turner v. Commissioners, m2 N. C. 153 (igoo); Trust Co. v.
Board of Education, 99 Pac. Rep. 150 (Utah, igog), Some jurisdictions
hold that property indirectly used for the benefit of public schools, but not
actually so employed, is not held for public use, may be alienated from the
municipality by prescription. School Directors v. Georges. 50 Mo. 194 (1872) ;
Trust Co. v. Board of Education, 99 Pac. Rep. z5o (Utah, igog). Other
jurisdictions guard municipal school property more jealously, and do not
allow unused school lands to be alienated. Board of Education v. Martin, 92
CaL 2o9 (1891).
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NEGLIGENCE-"LAST CLEAR CnANCE"-Since an engineer, after seeing that
the plaintiff, a trespasser, was engaged in removing the push car from the
tracks, could have avoided the collision, the defendant is liable, although the
plaintiff might also have avoided the accident by jumping away from the
tracks. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Harman, 217 Fed. Rep. 959 (1914).
The usual case to which the doctrine of "last clear chance" applies is
where the plaintiff by a remote act of negligence has placed himself in a
position where he cannot save himself, as, for instance, when he is dis-
covered on a bridge or trestle, or is driving a wild team hear railroad tracks
or when a person having through his own negligence become pinned under
an engine and is seriously injured by negligent moving of the engine. Louis-
ville Ry. Co. v. Harrod's Adm., iss Ky. i55 (1913); N. Y. C. & St. L R. R.
v. Ault, iO2 N. E. Rep. 988 (Ind. 1913). But when the injured party had
an equal opportunity with the defendant to save himself, having himself the
"last clear chance" to avoid injury, he cannot invoke the doctrine against the
defendant. Chabatt v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 77 N. H. 133 (1gx3); Clemens
v. Chicago Ry. Co., N44 . W. Rep. 354 (Ia. 1913) ; 62 U. oF P. L. R. 323.
The distinction, not always recognized between liability for wanton acts and
for failure to avail oneself of the" "last clear chance", is drawn in Higgin-
botham v. Gulf Ry. Co., iSS S. W. Rep. 1025 (Tex. 1913). As to liability under
this doctrine dependent upon the duty to look out for others, see Rashall v.
St. Louis Ry. Co., 249 Mo. So9 (iqxg).
The principal case is rather unique in that the inability of the plaintiff
to save himself in this case came from his desire to remove the car and
avoid, if possible, a -collision endangering the lives of others, whereas in
most cases there is an actual physical incapacity.
PARTNERsHip--LIAm y iN TORT OF PERSON HnL OUT AS A PARTNER--
The defendant dissolved partnership with his son but permitted -the business,
in which, thereafter, only the latter had an interest, to be conducted under
the former firm name of "Dieudonne & Son". Suit was brought against
the former, by -a person who entered the place of business as an invitee,
to recover damages for an injury there sustained in consequence of negligence
of one of the employees. The majority of the court held that "where, as in
this case, there is a h.olding out of a partnership relation concerning the
control of a place where business is transacted and an invitation to patronize
extended under such circumstances of publicity as to warrant the inference
that a person subsequently injuied therein through failure -to exercise due
care for his safety must have had the right to believe that those extending
the invitation were in control of the premises, liability results without regard
to the existence of the partnership relation". Jewison v. Dieudonne, 149 N. W.
Rep. 2o (Minn. 1914).
In Stables v. Eley, i C. & P. 614 (Eng. 1825), it was held that a retired
partner whose name was on a cart formerly used in the partnership business
was liable for the negligence of his former partner's employee in driving
it. This case has been criticised as bad law by many authorities. Lindley,
"Partnership" (8th ed.), p. 82. In Smith v. Bailey [189i] 2 Q. B. 4o3, in
which a contrary decision was reached upon analogous facts, the case was
said to have been misreported.
It is believed that the principle laid down in the principal case has never
before been enunciated. Two members of the court vigorously dissented
from the decision. One of the dissenting judges held that the doctrine of
"invitation had no application where the person sought to be held liable was
not in fact in possession or control of the premises. The other asserted that
it should not be said that, because one not a partner is willing to assume
liability to those'who give credit in reliance on his name, he must thereby
assume responsibility to the whole world to keep the partnership premises in
good condition."
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It is submitted that the minority view of the case is correct on prin-
ciple and by the weight of authority. Since the fundamental principle under-
lying partnership liability by estoppel requires that an extension of -credit
be made on the faith of the supposed partnership, the person held out as
a partner should not be held liable for any act in the course of the business
which is not part of the transaction whereby credit was extended. Shapard
v. Hynes, 45 C. C. A. 271 (igoo). However, a person held out as a partner
is liable for a tort founded upon a contract, when he would have been liable
upon the contract. Shenod v. Langdon, 21 Ia. 5x8 (1866).
For a discussion of this subject, see Lewis, "Iaw of Partnership", pp.
30-32.
PROPERTY-EASEMENT-EXTENT OF RIGHT OF OwN;ER OF EASEMENT-In
Draper v. Varnerin, xo7 N. E. Rep. 350 (Mass. 1914), it was held that one
having only an easement of passage over a private way has the right to make
reasonable repairs but is not entitled to alter the way materially by changing
its grade to the inconvenience of the owner of the fee.
As the burden of repair is by law imposed upon the owner of the ease-
ment, Taylor v. Whitehead, 2 Doug. 749 (Eng. 1781), a corresponding right
to repair is also conferred upon him. It is well settled that a right of way,
whether by grant or prescription, carries with it as incident thereto a right
to make reasonible repairs, Pomfret v. Ricroft, i Saund. 321 (Eng. 1668);
McMillan v. Cronin, 75 N. Y. 474 (1878) ; provided that the extent of the
easement is not thereby enlarged, Myers v. Baker, 6o N. Y. Supp. 797 (1899) ;
and provided the repairs are made without unnecessary inconvenience to
the owner of the fee. Hotckiss v. Young, -" Pac. Rep. 324 (Or. 19o3). This
privilege includes a right of entry upon the servient estate for the purpose
of making repairs whenever necessary. Knudsen v. Frost, 139 Pac. Rep. 53
(Col. 1914). But in the case of a public highway, there is no right to
repair, for there is no obligation to do so. Campbell Davys v. Lloyd [igoil
2 Ch. 518.
It is well settled that the owner of an easement can make no alteration
which will increase the restrictions on the use of the servient estate. \West
Arlington Land Co. v. Flannery, 8o Atl. Rep. 965 (Md. 1911). If there are
several owners in common of an easement, one of them cannot make any
alterations which will render it less convenient and useful to any appreciable
extent to any of the others. Ellis v. Academy of Music, 12o Pa. 6o8 (1888);
Killian v. Kelly, i2o Mass. 47 (1876). It has been held, however, that where
a private way has become useless by a change in the grade of the public
highway with which it connects, the owner of the easement may lower its
grade to a corresponding level. Nichols v. Peck, 70 Conn. 439 (1898).
ToRTs-Dur- OF OWNER OF DoMESTIc ANIMAL OF VICIOUS PROPENSITY-
The defendant allowed an Angora cat in his custody to run at large, and
it bit the plaintiff. The plaintiff requested the court to charge that if the
cat was vicious to the knowledge of the defendant, he was liable without
regard as to whether or not he was negligent in restraining it. Held: The
refusal to so charge was not error. Bischoff v. Cheney, 92 Atd. Rep. 66o
(Conn. 1914).
The court in the principal case ruled that although the law would pre-
sume negligence from the trespass of a cat of such known propensities, it
might be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care. In this it is opposed
to the great preponderance of authority, which holds that the gist of the
action is not negligence in keeping the animal but the keeping with knowl-
edge of its vicious propensities. According to these authorities one having
such knowledge keeps the animal at his peril. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y.
195 (1878); Brooks v. Taylor, 65 Mich. 2o8 (1887); Popplewell v. Pierce,
1o Cush. 5o9 (Mass. 1852). A minority of jurisdictions take the view of the
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principal case and hold that negligence is essential. Hayes v. Smith, 62 Ohio,
i61 (xgoo) ; Take v. Addicks, 45 Minn. 37 (189O). Tie majority rule has been
criticised in that if the keeping of vicious animals is not unlawful per se, no
wrong can come from it until some wrongful circumstance intervenes; in
other words until there is negligence. 2 Cooley on Torts (3d ed.), 7o6. The
duty to protect against vicious domestic animals is imposed upon the keeper,
regardless of ownership. Marsh v. Jones, 21 Vt. 378 (x849). While in the
case of domestic animals knowledge of the vicious nature is imperative,
Dix v. Somerset Coal Co., 1o4 N. E. Rep. 433 (Mass. 1914), when rcienter
is proved the keeper is placed substantially in the position of a keeper of
animals ferae naturae whose liability is absolute. Phillips v. Garner, 64 So.
Rep. 735 (Miss. 1914). To the general rule there is an exception where the
animals are kept in the course of a public duty, as in the case of a keeper of
a "zoo", the liability then arising only from negligence. Jackson v. Baker,
24 App. Cas. zoo (D. C. i9o4). In the case of bees there is an apparent
exception based upon the useful and valuable nature of the species. Earl v.
Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630 (N. Y. i85o). In any case no liability can arise
unless the harm results from the vicious propensity of the animal and not
from its mere size or appearance. Scribner v. Kelley, 38 Barb. 14 (N. Y.
1862).
Toas-LiAaxuTv OF MUNICIPALITY FOR EXCAVATIOx NEAR HIGHWAY-A
traveler upon a public highway was injured by falling into an unguarded
excavation near the highway. Held: If a highway is made unsafe by an
excavation outside the limits of the highway, the town was bound to guard
the excavation. Smith v. Town of Milford, 92 Ati. Rep. 675 (Conn. 1914).
Towns are required to fence their highways only where some dangerous
place or object exists so close to the traveled road as to expose persons
traveling thereon to injury through some of the mischances incident to such
use of the road. Comm. v. Wilmington, 1o5 Mass. 599 (187o). They are -not
required to provide barriers to prevent travelers from straying out of the
limits of the road. Warner v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362 (1873); Roth v.
Baltimore, 8o At. Rep. io3i (Ind. i91i). In determining whether the absence
of a railing is a defect in a highway, the material facts are the character and
amount of travel, the character of the road itself, its width, extent of the
slope of bank and whether the danger is obvious. Seeton v. Dunburton, 56
AUt. Rep. i97 (N. H. 1903); Malloy v. Walker Twp., 77 Mich. 448 (I88g).
Where a road is erected at such a height and so narrow as to require
railings to make it reasonably safe for public travel, it is the duty of a town-
ship to erect such railings. Lamb v. Clam Lake Twp., 14o N. W. Rep. 1o9
(Mich. 1913) ; Davis v. Snyder Twp., 196 Pa. 273 (1900). Where a road runs
to the bank of a ravine the town was negligent in not erecting a safeguard
at end of the road. Higman v. Quinduro Twp., 132 Pac. Rep. 215 (KarL
1913). An area of sand at the side of a highway is not such a dangerous
condition as calls for the erection of a barrier. Doherty v. Town of Ayer,
83 N. E. Rep. 677 (Mass. i9O8). A town, not having time to repair a defect
adjoining a highway after notice thereof, is nevertheless liable for failure.
to guard the defect. Perry v. Sheldon, 75 At. Rep. 69o (R.-I. ig9o).
WiLLs-DEsGNATION OF ATToRNEY-GiFT-A direction in a will that one
of three executors serving without compensation, should act as attorney for
the estate and to 'receive for his services as such two thousand dollars per
annum from the income of the estate, was not intended for the pecuniary
benefit of the appointee and is not binding on the other executors who may
appoint another as attorney. In re "vVallack, I5o N. Y. Supp. ;302 (1914)."
The two questions as to the right of the appointee to the compensation
and the obligation on the executors to recognize him as attorney are considered
independently.
RECENT CASES
Had the court 0,cihled. as it might reasonably have done, that 
the
appointment was intended for the pecuniary benefit of the appointee, the same
result would have been reached. Two comparatively old English cases hold
that appointment to an office of trust may become the subject of a valid
trust, if the motive of the testator was to confer a pecuniary benefit on 
the
appointee. Hibbert v. Hibbert, 3 Mer. 681 (Eng. x8o8); Williams v. Corbet.
8 Sim. 349 (Eng. 1837). The words "particular desire" and "my wish 
and
desire" were held not sufficiently strong to create a trust the !rubject 
matter
of which was so uncertain a thing as the office of manager of 
an estate,
etc. Shaw v. Lawless, 2 Cl. & Fin. i-29 (Eng. 1837) ; Finden v. Stephens, 
2
Phil. x42 (Eng. 1846). The first case in which the appointee was an attorney
was Foster v. Elsley, L. R. ip Ch. Div. 5x8 (Eng. i8S'), in which; 
relying
on Finden v. Stephens and Shaw v. Lawless, and without consideration 
of
the fact that the appointment was in mandatory words and possibly 
intended
for the pecuniary benefit of the appointee an appointment of one 
as solicitor
in management of an estate, was held not to create a trust in that 
person's
favor. The cases in common law made it impossible for a testator 
by any
words to bind the executors in the selection of an attorney for 
the estate.
The principal case finds support *in dicta from an earlier New 
York case.
Matter of Caldwell. 188 N. Y. tt5 (19o7). The commands 
of an executor
in that respect have been held to be mere expressions of an earnest 
wish,
which it is exceedingly proper for the executors to gratify, if, and 
only if,
they see fit. Furthermore the attorney is in reality not an officer 
of the
estate but counselor to the executor and. hence, not within the power 
of the
testator. In re Ogiss, 10 Cal. 381 (1894) ; Pickett's Will, 49 Ore. 
127 (19O7).
While those two cases are silent on the matter of the intention 
to confer a
pecuniary benefit on the appointee, the case of Young v. Alexander, 
x6 Lea,
io8 (Tenn. x885), considers the effect of such an intention and 
announces
what appears to be the proper rule on the subject. It was there 
held that
an appointee may, under no circumstances, compel the executors 
to accept
his services nor restrain them from retaining other counsel. 
If, however,
the appointment was made by way of gift, the 'appointee may, 
upon rejection
of his services, recover from the estate the reasonable 'value of 
the services
which he could have rendered.
The reasons given in the principal case for the decision seem conclusive
and are borne out by authority. In the first place there is such 
a relation
of confidence between attorney and client as is inconsistent with 
the right of
a third person to denominate who shall sustain that relation. 
Matter of
Dunn, 2o5 N. Y. 398 (1912). This is shown by the rule that a 
client may
dismiss his attorney at will, without cause shown. In re Paschal, 77 U. S.
483 (1870); Parish v. McGowan, 39 App. D. 
C. 184 (1913). So an attorney
may withdraw for good cause, and the fact that the client appoints 
as asso-
ciate counsel a person displeasing to the original attorney, 
is good cause for
the attorney to withdraw. Tenney v. Berger, 73 N. Y. 524 (x883). 
Another
argument by the court in the principal case is that the attorney 
may by his
misdeeds subject the executor to a personal liability and 
that the executor
being primarily liable personally for the attorney's fee should 
have the right
to select his own attorney. In re Lutz's Estate, 175 Mo. App. 
427 (913)-
Howell v. Meyer, 63 So. Rep. 233 (Miss. 1913). In the Wallack 
case, since the
compensation named was held not to be a gift, of course, the 
executors could
collect from the estate a reasonable fee for their attorney. 
It re Lutz's
Fstate, supra. Where more than one attorney has been retained 
by executors,
the reasonable grounds for retaining more than one has been 
the criterion
to judge the compensation allowed each. -In rc Byrne's Estate, 
122 Cal. 260
(1898); Crowder v. Shackleford, 35 Miss. 321 (i858). An 
interesting situa-
tion would arise where the executors, being unwilling to accept 
an appointed
attorney, are nevertheless forced to give him compensation 
intended as a gift
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and then the executors attempt to collect from the estate fees for attorneys
who actually performed the work.
The attempt of the appointee in the principal case to appoint himself as
attorney was frustrated, since an executor cannot collect from an estate for
legal services rendered by himself. In re German's Estate, 144 Ill. App. iog
(z9o8). As to the right to collect for services of partner in law firm. see
Taylor v. Wright, 93 Ind. 121 (1883); Parker v. Day, 155 N. Y. 383 (i898).
